Bridgewater Review
Volume 32 | Issue 2

Article 4

Nov-2013

Measuring the Stuff of Thought: Psychology and its
Discontents
Brendan J. Morse
Bridgewater State University, brendan.morse@bridgew.edu

Recommended Citation
Morse, Brendan J. (2013). Measuring the Stuff of Thought: Psychology and its Discontents. Bridgewater Review, 32(2), 4-7.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/br_rev/vol32/iss2/4

This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.

Measuring the Stuff of Thought:
Psychology and its Discontents
Brendan J. Morse
he human brain ranks among the most
complicated biological machines in the known
universe. Trillions of wet-wired synaptic
pathways carry electrical and chemical information
at a paradoxically slow speed but with such massively
distributed processing, we can function seamlessly in
our environment. No computer has yet achieved this
level of open, dynamic functioning and the brainas-a-computer analogy is a misnomer on nearly all
fronts. Renowned British science writer Arthur C.
Clarke (1917-2008) once remarked that any sufficiently
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic,
an apt description for the human brain and our state
of understanding how it works.
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Researchers who study the brain from
basic neuroscience to applied psychology are striving for unambiguous measures of cognitive functions. Although
the capability exists to listen to individual neurons and map the circuitry
of the brain and its neurotransmitters, we still cannot make direct links
between basic brain activity and the
stuff of thoughts. We can classify how
the constituent parts of the brain function, but something is missing between
the neuro-activity and our conscious
experience. This gap is known as the
ambiguity of measurement and it lies at
the heart of our understanding of our
biological and experiential selves.
When studying cognition, we do not
measure anything directly. There is
no litmus, scale, or thermometer that
measures psychological phenomena
with anything near objectivity.
Intelligence, depression, creativity,
psychopathy, and a host of other
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constructs that define the human
experience are simply semantic shortcuts for characteristics that we can hold
in our hands no more than we could a
wisp of smoke. These phenomena are
assumed to exist and cause variations
in our thinking, feeling, and behavior.
We can liken the study of psychological
constructs to that of dark matter – we
are reasonably certain it is there because
we see its effects but it is not within our
observable sphere.

A New Science,
a New Discipline

Although the capability exists
to listen to individual neurons
and map the circuitry of the
brain and its neurotransmitters,
we still cannot make direct links
between basic brain activity and
the stuff of thoughts.

In Germany, pioneering psychologist
In the 19th and early 20th centuries,
the field of psychology had an academic Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) felt that
psychology should be the experimenidentity crisis, and the heart of the
tal arm of philosophy, but James was
matter quickly focused on how psystrongly opposed. His was a new scichological phenomena were measence that required its own
ured. Most psychological
discipline on par with the
researchers at the time
established natural sciwere located in philosoences. James argued that
phy departments. William
psychologists ask scientific
James (1842-1910), the
questions and utilize scifather of American experientific methods to answer
mental psychology, headed
those questions. At the
Harvard’s philosophy
time, nascent psychologists
department for lack of
were primarily investigata more aptly suited post
ing psycho-physiological
William
James
(1842(and if you want to really
1910):
Father
of
American
phenomena such as sensaneedle Harvard philosoexperimental psychology
tion, perception, and reacphers, point out that the
tion times; mental-health
first Ph.D. conferred by
researchers
and pure cognitivists had
the Harvard philosophy department
yet to enter the fray. The exceptions to
was actually granted in psychology in
this general characterization of the field
1887 to G. Stanley Hall [1844-1924],
included individuals such as French
who studied under James’ direction).

“Cognitive science is the
creationism of psychology.
It is an effort to reinstate that
inner initiating, originating
creative self or mind which,
in a scientific analysis, simply
does not exist.”
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scholars Théodore Simon (1872-1961)
and Alfred Binet (1857-1911), who were
engaged in measuring the mental
capabilities of French schoolchildren,
and Englishman Sir Francis Galton
(1822-1911), who forwarded intelligence as a heritable trait and subsequently grandstanded for the eugenics
movement. Regardless, for many
psychologists in these years, the mind
was still a mysterious entity. James
himself was deeply interested in studying consciousness with the liberal use
of nitrous oxide as an experimental
catalyst (he served as his own subject).
The important point was that their
methods of experimentation were
performed with scientific rigor.
In time, a group of physicists, speaking
for many early 20th-century scholars,
attempted an intellectual take-down
of the new discipline based on the
tenets of measurement and calculation.
In the 1920s and 30s, British physicists
such as J. Guild and N. R. Campbell
(1880-1949) reasoned that any field
of research that does not achieve
fundamental measurement is not a science.
This reasoning naturally stemmed
from their position that physics was
the science of measurement. Haughty
debates at meetings of scientific academies ensued. All measurement can be
generally defined as the application of
a system of numbers to some pheno
menon of interest—the intersection of
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The new Connectome scanner…
can follow individual water
molecules along a neural
pathway and creates stunning
three-dimensional spaghetti
maps of the brain.

White Matter Fibers, HCP Dataset Red Corpus Callosum (Courtesy of Connectome Project, Institute for
Neuroimaging and Informatics, Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern California).

mathematics and reality. Fundamental
measurement was held as the complete
lack of ambiguity between the numbers
used to describe a phenomenon and the
phenomenon itself. For example,
a physical property of an object such as
height has fundamental measurement.
There is no way to manipulate the
physical reality of an object’s height by
using different measurement methods.
Additionally, the number zero holds
a special meaning in fundamental
measurement such that it implies that
the object no longer exists (at least in
our dimensional reality). Further, and
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perhaps most importantly, mathematical calculations can be performed with
those numbers and the results can be
readily interpreted. Stretching and
squeezing the numbers themselves
does not result in any ambiguity about
the empirical nature of the object or
phenomenon. For Guild, Campbell
and others, psychology was measurement deficient and not worthy of
scientific status. Ironically, fundamental
measurement as the paragon of physics
falls on its face in Niels Bohr’s strange
quantum universe that defines our
subatomic selves.

Measurement and Meaning
Definitions about what makes a science
aside, these criticisms of psychology
and measurement were true during the
earliest volleys of this debate and they
remain true today. Numbers that are
used in any measurement context exist
along a continuum of ambiguity, and
psychology dabbles in the deep, murky
end of that spectrum. No one has ever
physically held intelligence or happiness, either in their living states or postmortem. Some general conclusions can
be drawn about differences in the depth
and density of the grooves and fissures
between the brains of, say, Einstein or
Yo-Yo Ma and the masses, but these do
not give us objective ways of measuring
individual differences in a meaningful (or practical) way. Ours is a science
of probabilities. We use a wide array
of measurement “instruments” from
self-report surveys (How much do you
agree/disagree with the following
statements?) to timed perceptual or
logic tests to high-tech imaging and
then draw conclusions about what most
people would do, most of the time,
under a certain set of conditions. It is
hardly a recipe for objectivity.
This lack of objectivity gave way in
the middle part of the 20th century to
the dominance of behaviorism. Wellknown researchers such as Americans
John Watson (1878-1958) and B. F.
Skinner (1904-1990) envisioned and
promoted a science sterilized to overt,
quantifiable behaviors, eschewing the
“black box” of the mind and its invisible properties. These middle ages of
psychology elevated the primacy of
the scientific method above what its
proponents saw as superf luous assumptions. In his last public address at the
Boston convention of the American
Psychological Association in 1990,
Skinner accepted a lifetime contribution award and took the podium to
opine that there is no room, or need, for
the mind and self in a scientific account
of behavior. “Cognitive science is the
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creationism of psychology,” he stated.
“It is an effort to reinstate that inner
initiating, originating creative self or
mind which, in a scientific analysis,
simply does not exist.” In this statement, the mechanisms of thought and
the ambiguity of measurement inherent
in its understanding were denounced
by perhaps the most famous living psychologist at the time in his inimitable,
pithy oratorical style.

of math ability or attraction. In fact, a
recent spate of articles in Perspectives on
Psychological Science, a leading experimental psychology journal, point out
that many statistical results attributed
to brain scanning research had serious
f laws, some the result of mathematical
impossibilities. These results escaped
peer-review scrutiny because of the
over-generalized assumptions that have
become commonplace with regard to

No matter how far our
technology advances, we may
not be able to measure and
comprehend the ephemeral
path from neurotransmission to
thinking, feeling, and behavior.
However, this ambiguity has spawned
further inquiry. Researchers in the field
of psychometrics have been steadily
working to define the mathematical
and logical properties of psychological
constructs and the instruments
that are used to measure those constructs. Psychometricians work as
theorists and statisticians who attempt
to define a mathematical representation
of everything from decision-making
to anxiety. Although technologies
such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) have given
us glimpses into the activity in the
brain while participants in the lab are
doing everything from math exercises to having an amorous encounter
with their lovers, they have still not
brought us much closer to having an
objective, unambiguous assessment
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the mathematical properties of our
measurements and the quantitative
skills of many researchers. Nonetheless,
there are still promising waves of
excitement and innovation in the
measurement of psychological phenomena. The new Connectome scanner at
Massachusetts General Hospital can
follow individual water molecules along
a neural pathway and creates stunning
three-dimensional spaghetti maps of
the brain. Further, President Obama’s
April 2013 announcement of the
Brain Initiative promises to infuse
much needed resources into exactly
this type of research. In these efforts,
it is important to keep in mind that
purely objective measurement is the
wrong way to define science. Working
along the ambiguity of measurement
spectrum is a driver of innovation
and discovery about what makes us
sentient beings.

The entire issue boils down to complexity. The brain is an enigmatically
complex organ in which our consciousness and higher-level processing arise
from a dense web of protein chains.
It is there, in the embodiment of this
emergence, where the combination
of chemical reactions creates our
perceptual experiences. Trying to
connect this neural activity directly
to an experience or a thought is
complex and difficult. It involves
many levels of analysis and the connection may not be possible to capture
in one instance. It is our Heisenberg
uncertainty principle. Multiple features cannot be observed directly and
the very act of observation changes
at least one of those features. All
scientific disciplines are creatures of
their methodology and all sciences
make assumptions in their process
and measurement. Here, in Arthur
C. Clarke’s parlance, lies the magic
of the interaction between our brains
and ourselves. No matter how far our
technology advances, we may not be
able to measure and comprehend the
ephemeral path from neurotransmission
to thinking, feeling, and behavior. We
are, ironically, beyond our own ability
to fathom.

Brendan J. Morse is Assistant Professor in
the Department of Psychology.
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